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Abstract 
This paper investigates the implications for monetary policy of financial markets 
that are internationally integrated but have intrinsic frictions. When there is no 
other distortion than financial market imperfections in the form of staggered 
international loan contracts, financial stability, which here constitutes eliminating 
the inefficient fluctuations of loan premiums, is the optimal monetary policy in 
open economies, regardless of whether policy coordination is possible. Yet, the 
optimality of inward-looking monetary policy requires an extra condition, in 
addition to those included in previous studies on the optimal monetary policy in 
open economies. To make allocations between cooperative and noncooperative 
monetary policy coincide, the exchange rate risk must be perfectly covered by the 
banks. Otherwise, each central bank has an additional incentive to control the 
nominal exchange rate to favor firms in her own country by reducing the exchange 
rate risk. 
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 1 Introduction
Financial globalization has been expanding quite rapidly. We can easily observe this trend
from recent ￿nancial and economic developments. For example, many banks in the world
now su⁄er from losses stemming from the US subprime loan crisis. Gadanecz (2004),
McGuire and Tarashev (2006), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007, 2008) formally show
that more funds from foreign countries are ￿ owing into the domestic ￿nancial markets
of many countries. Although we can ￿nd several studies investigating the implications of
goods market integration for monetary policy, as summarized in Woodford (2007), very few
studies have focused on monetary policy under global banking or internationally integrated
￿nancial markets.
Does international ￿nancial stability matter for central banks? How do international ￿-
nancial market developments alter the form of the optimal monetary policy? Should central
banks conduct monetary policy cooperatively when ￿nancial markets are internationally
integrated?
In order to answer these questions, we construct a new open economy macroeconomic
(NOEM) model that incorporates international loan contracts by extending Fujiwara and
Teranishi (2008). In our model, ￿nancial markets are characterized by staggered loan
contracts following the Calvo (1983) - Yun (1996) framework. Stickiness in the loan contract
rate is reported by many studies, for example Slovin and Sushka (1983) and Berger and
Udell (1992) for the US economy, Sorensen and Werner (2006) and Gambacorta (2008) for
the euro area economy, and Bank of Japan (2007) for the Japanese economy.1 For detailed
modeling of the ￿nancial market, it is popular to incorporate the ￿nancial accelerator
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, where net worth as the state variable
1For the US, using micro level data, Slovin and Sushka (1983) and Berger and Udell (1992) show that
it takes two or more quarters for the private banks to adjust the loan interest rates. For the euro area,
Sorensen and Werner (2006) estimate the incompleteness in the pass-through from the policy interest rate
to loan interest rates via an error correction model using macro data. They further show that the degree
to which pass-through is incomplete di⁄ers signi￿cantly among countries. Gambacorta (2008) conducted
a similar analysis for Germany and shows the existence of sticky adjustment in the loan interest rate.
For Japan, according to BOJ (2007), the major city banks need ￿ve quarters and local banks need seven
quarters to adjust their loan interest rates.
1causes the deviations of loan rates from the policy interest rate, as in Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999). The staggered loan contract model can be considered a simpli￿cation or
another type of ￿nancial market friction. We aim to capture the dynamics of loan rates by
staggered loan contracts instead of through net worth dynamics. In our model, the wedge
between the loan rate and the policy rate is due to imperfect competition among banks;
this follows Sander and Kleimeier (2004), Gropp, Sorensen, and Lichtenberger (2007), van
Leuvensteijn, Sorensen, Bikker, and van Rixtel (2008) and Gropp and Kashyap (2009),
who point out the importance of bank competition in the staggered loan rate setting. The
end consequences are, however, the same irrespective of which of these models is adopted.2
A shock related to the ￿nancial market imperfections eventually results in an increase in
the costs of goods production.3 The most advantageous feature of our approach is that
we can analyze the nature of the optimal monetary policy analytically and therefore more
intuitively.
Welfare analysis shows that the central banks should stabilize the international ￿nancial
disturbance, implying the central bank should care about international ￿nancial market
heterogeneity between domestic and foreign countries. Most notably, when there is no
other distortion than staggered loan contracts as examined in this paper, ￿nancial stabil-
ity, which in this context constitutes eliminating the ine¢ cient ￿ uctuation in loan premiums
stemming from ￿nancial market imperfections, turns out to represent the optimal mone-
tary policy in open economies irrespective of whether or not there is cooperation between
central banks. Each central bank should aim at stabilizing the loan premium. Yet, the
optimality of inward-looking, i.e., independent, monetary policy requires an additional con-
dition on top of those included in previous studies on the optimal monetary policy in open
economies. Speci￿cally, for allocations between cooperative and noncooperative monetary
2Nevertheless, initial responses of loan rates to the monetary policy shock are quite di⁄erent. In the
￿nancial accelerator model, the response is much larger than in our model. Where this di⁄erence comes
from is not, however, a trivial question. Morozumi (2008) shows that the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism
does act to amplify the responses to a monetary policy shock but does not make them persistent. To
investigate which is superior for empirical accounting is left for our future research.
3There exist models where ￿nancial market imperfections a⁄ect the aggregate TFP. See, for example,
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007).
2policy to coincide, the exchange rate risk must be perfectly covered by lenders. Otherwise,
each central bank has an additional incentive to control the nominal exchange rate so as to
favor ￿rms in her own country by reducing the exchange rate risk. Thus, joint management
of the exchange rate through cooperative monetary policy improves global welfare when
￿rms￿marginal costs of production are exposed to exchange rate ￿ uctuations. These rep-
resent new ￿ndings that are not considered in previous studies that investigate the optimal
monetary policy in open economies such as Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002), Clarida, Gal￿, and
Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Devereux and Engel (2003), and Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model used for the
analyses in this paper. Then, in Section 3, we derive the loss function that the central
bank should minimize. Section 4 investigates the nature of the optimal monetary policy in
internationally integrated ￿nancial markets. Section 5 provides a short discussion of the
results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the ￿ndings of this paper.
2 Model
The model consists of two countries. There are four types of agent in each country￿
consumers, ￿rms, private banks and the central bank￿ as depicted in Figure 1.
2.1 Consumers
A representative consumer has four roles: (1) to consume di⁄erentiated goods determined
through two-step cost minimization problems on both home- and foreign-produced con-
sumer goods; (2) to choose the amount of aggregate consumption, bank deposits and
investment in risky assets given a deposit interest rate set by the central bank; (3) with
monopolistic power over labor supply, to provide di⁄erentiated labor services that depend
on whether he belongs to either domestically ￿nancially supported (DFS) or the interna-
tionally ￿nancially supported (IFS) groups, as well as to o⁄er wages to those di⁄erentiated
types of labor; and (4) to own banks and ￿rms and to receive dividends in each period.
Role (3) is crucial in staggered loan contracts. Thanks to this di⁄erentiated labor supply,
3Figure 1: Agents in the Model
the demand for loans is di⁄erentiated without assuming any restrictions on aggregate loans
or loan interest rates.4
2.1.1 Cost Minimization
The utility of the representative consumer in the home country H comes from the aggregate
consumption index Ct. The consumption index that consists of bundles of di⁄erentiated







   (1 ￿  )
1￿ ; (1)
where   (0 ￿   ￿ 1) is a preference parameter that expresses the home bias, which is set
to be 0.5 in this paper, implying no home bias.5 Here, CH;t and CF;t are consumption
subindices of the continuum of di⁄erentiated goods produced by ￿rms in the home country










4For details, see Teranishi (2007).











where ct (f) is the demand for a good produced by ￿rm f in the home country and ct (f￿)
is the demand for a good produced by a ￿rm f￿ in the foreign country, where the asterisk
denotes foreign variables. Following the standard cost minimization problem on the aggre-
gate consumption index of home and foreign goods as well as the consumption subindices of


























where pt (f) is the price given ct (f), and pt (f￿) is the price given ct (f￿). Then, we

























Here, as in other applications of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, consumers￿allo-
cations across di⁄erentiated goods at each time are optimal in terms of cost minimization.
We can derive similar optimality conditions for the foreign counterpart. For example,























































where Et is the expectations operator conditional on the state of nature at date t and ￿ is
the subjective discount factor. The functions U and V are increasing and concave in the
consumption index and the labor supply, respectively. The disutility of the representative
consumer in the home country H comes from the labor supplies lT(h) and lT(h). The
budget constraint of the consumer is given by









t ￿ Tt; (5)
where Bt is a set of risky asset, Dt is deposit to private banks, it is the nominal deposit
interest rate set by a central bank from t ￿ 1 to t, wt(h) is the nominal wage for la-





t￿1(h)dh is the nominal dividend stemming from the ownership of both local




t￿1(f)df is the nominal dividend
from the ownership of the ￿rms in the domestic country, Xt;t+1 is the stochastic discount
factor, and Tt is the lump sum tax.6 Here, because we assume a complete ￿nancial market
between the two countries, the consumer in each country can conduct international pur-
chases and sales of the state contingent securities to insure against country-speci￿c shocks.
Consequently, there exists only one unique discount factor. The relationship between the
deposit interest rate and the stochastic discount factor is now expressed as
1
1 + it
= Et [Xt;t+1]: (6)
Given the optimal allocation of di⁄erentiated consumption expenditure, the consumer now
optimally chooses the total amount of consumption, risky assets and deposits in each
6For simplicity, we do not explicitly include the amount of contingency claims under complete ￿nancial
markets.
6period. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions, when the transversality condition is satis￿ed,
for those optimizations are given by















Together with equation (6), we see that the condition given by equation (7) de￿nes the
intertemporally optimal allocation on aggregate consumption. Then, the standard New
Keynesian IS curve for the home country, by log-linearizing equation (7) around steady
states, is obtained as follows:
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 ￿ ￿
￿
b it ￿ Et￿t+1
￿
; (8)
where aggregate in￿ ation in the home country is ￿t ￿ ln Pt
Pt￿1 and ￿ ￿ ￿ UC
UCCC. Each
variable is de￿ned as the log deviation from its steady-state value, where the log-linearized
version of variable xt is expressed by b xt = ln(xt=x), except for ￿t, given that x is the
steady-state value of xt.
In this model, the representative consumer provides all types of di⁄erentiated labor to
each ￿rm and therefore maintains some monopoly power over the determination of his own
wage, as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000).7 There are two types of labor group: the
DFS and the IFS. The population of workers located on [0;n) belong to the DFS, while
those located on [n;1] belong to the IFS.8 We assume that each ￿rm hires all types of labor
in the same proportion from the two groups. The consumer sets the wage wt(h) for any
h and wt(h) for any h to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint given by
equation (5) and the labor demand functions given by equations (24) and (25) in the next
section. Here, although di⁄erentiated labor supply is assumed, consumers change wages in









7The same optimal allocations are obtained even when each consumer provides di⁄erentiated labor
supply to each ￿rm.
8Di⁄erences between these two groups comprise broader characteristics, such as whether a worker is
English speaking or Japanese speaking; di⁄erences within groups comprise narrower characteristics, like


















where " is the elasticity of substitution among di⁄erentiated labor. As written above,
thanks to this heterogeneity in labor supply, we can model the di⁄erentiated demand for
loans without assuming any restrictions on aggregate loans and loan interest rates. In this
paper, consumers supply their labor only to ￿rms, not to banks.
As in the above case with cost minimization, we can derive the optimality conditions
for the foreign counterpart. For example, the standard New Keynesian IS curve for the
foreign country is
b C￿























where S is the nominal exchange rate and Q is the real exchange rate. As we will see below,
because of the symmetry in the home bias parameter and because no nominal rigidities are
assumed in this paper:
C￿
t = Ct ￿ CW
t ; (12)
where CW
t is the world consumption and
Qt = 1:
However, re￿ ecting the nominal interest rate set by the central bank, nominal exchange
rates can ￿ uctuate according to the UIP condition as
Et￿St+1 =b it ￿b i￿
t; (13)
which can also be expressed as
￿b St = ￿t ￿ ￿￿
t: (14)
82.2 Firms
There exists a continuum of ￿rms populated over unit mass [0;1] in each country. Each
￿rm plays two roles. Firstly, it decides the amount of di⁄erentiated labor to be employed
from the DFS and IFS groups, through a two-step minimization of its production costs.
Part of the costs of labor must be ￿nanced by external loans from banks. For example, in
country H, to ￿nance the costs of hiring workers from the DFS group, the ￿rm must borrow
from local banks in the home country. However, to ￿nance the costs of hiring workers from
the IFS group, the ￿rm must borrow from international banks in the foreign country. The
grounds for such heterogeneous sources of funds are as follows. First, Gadanecz (2004),
McGuire and Tarashev (2006), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2008) show that ￿rms tend to borrow funds from both domestic and foreign banks;
i.e., a bank lends funds to both domestic and foreign ￿rms. Second, we also know from
looking at actual project ￿nance that ￿rms borrow funds with many di⁄erent loan interest
rates at the same time depending on the nature of projects. In this paper, these project
di⁄erences stem from the types of labor, which are immobile between the two countries.
Since it is assumed that ￿rms must use all types of labor, they borrow from both local
and international banks.9 The structure of the exchange rate risk sharing is as follows.
Domestic ￿rms borrow ￿ ￿ 100 percent of loans in foreign currency from international
banks in the foreign country. Thus, the exchange rate risk is shared by the ￿rm in the
home country and the international banks in the foreign country in the ratio ￿ to 1 ￿ ￿.
Secondly, each ￿rm resets goods price to maximize her present pro￿t in a ￿ exible
manner.
2.2.1 Cost Minimization
Firms in both the home and foreign countries optimally hire di⁄erentiated labor as price
takers. This optimal labor allocation is also carried out via a two-step cost minimization.
Domestic ￿rm f hires all types of labor from both the DFS and IFS groups. When hiring
from the DFS group, ￿ portion of the labor cost associated with labor type h is ￿nanced
9The same structure is assumed for employment in Woodford (2003).
9by borrowing from the local bank h. Then, the ￿rst-step of the cost minimization problem





[1 + ￿rt (h)]wt (h)lt(h;f)dh;














where rt(h) is the loan interest rate applied to employ a particular labor type h during
time t, and lt(h;f) denotes type of labor h employed by ￿rm f. The local bank h has some
monopoly power over setting loan interest rates. The relative demand for di⁄erentiated






















Then, the ￿rst-step cost minimization problem to determine the allocation of di⁄eren-







































where ￿ is the proportion of borrowing carried out in the domestic currency.10 Through
a similar cost minimization problem, we can derive the relative demand for each type of






























10We here assume either one period delivery lag for the loan repayment to the foreign country or segmented

























According to the above two optimality conditions, ￿rms optimally choose the allocation
of di⁄erentiated workers between these two groups. Because ￿rms have some preference n
to hire workers from the DFS group and (1 ￿ n) to hire workers from the IFS group, the
second-step cost minimization to determine the allocation of di⁄erentiated labor between
these two groups is given by
min
Lt;Lt
￿tLt (f) + ￿tLt (f);
subject to the aggregate labor index:





nn (1 ￿ n)
1￿n : (20)
Then, the relative demand functions for each di⁄erentiated type of labor are derived as
follows:

















Therefore, we can obtain the following equations:
lt (h;f) =
￿



























e Lt (f); (25)
from equations (16), (18), (21), and (22). We can now clearly see that the demand for each
di⁄erentiated worker depends on wages and loan interest rates, given the total demand for
labor.
11Finally, from the assumption that ￿rms ￿nance part of their labor costs by loans, we
can derive
qt (h;f) = ￿wt (h)lt (h;f) = ￿wt (h)
￿













































denote the amounts borrowed by ￿rm f to ￿nance labor costs accruing
from labor types h and h, respectively. These conditions demonstrate that the demands
for each di⁄erentiated loan also depend on the wages and loan interest rates, given the
total labor demand.
We can obtain similar conditions for the foreign country.
2.2.2 Price Setting (Pro￿t Maximization)
In this paper, where the focus is on understanding the role of international staggered loan
contracts, we assume no price rigidities. Therefore, each ￿rm f resets its price pt (f) and
p￿
t (f) to maximize present pro￿t given by
(1 + ￿)pt (f)ct (f) + (1 + ￿)Stp￿
t (f)c￿
t (f) ￿ e ￿te Lt (f);
where ￿ is the rate of subsidy, St is the nominal exchange rate and is the sales subsidy to
eliminate the monopolistic rents in the steady state.11 By substituting equations (3) and
(4), we can obtain

























t ￿e ￿te Lt (f):








11As is standard with New Keynesian models, ￿scal policy eliminates the steady-state markup from goods
production.
12where we use equation (3). By further substituting equations (9), (10), (17), (19) and (23),
the above optimality condition can be now rewritten as



































































because without nominal rigidities,
PH;t = pt (f):
By log-linearizing equation (26), we can derive
c mct = ￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿
H;t + d lmct + (1 ￿ n)￿
￿




where we use equation (13) and, ￿1 ￿ n
￿(1+RSS)
1+￿RSS and ￿2 ￿ (1 ￿ n)
￿(1+RSS)
1+￿RSS are positive
parameters, and under symmetric equilibrium, the marginal cost with respect to labor



































We here also de￿ne the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the home country






















Similarly, regarding the optimal price setting of p￿
t (f), we can derive
c mc
￿





2 b RF;t ￿ (1 ￿ n￿)￿￿
￿




where we use equation (13) and ￿￿
1 ￿ n￿ ￿(1+RSS)
1+￿RSS > 0 and ￿￿
2 ￿ (1 ￿ n￿)
￿(1+RSS)
1+￿RSS > 0.
RF;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by international banks in the foreign country and
R￿
F;t is the aggregate loan interest rate by local banks in the foreign country.
2.2.3 Marginal Cost with respect to Labor Input
Here, we derive the equations for d lmct and d lmc
￿
t. By linearizing equation (20) under
symmetric equilibrium, we can obtain
b e Lt ￿ nb Lt + (1 ￿ n) b Lt:
Because the production function of each ￿rm is assumed to be





where f (￿) is an increasing and concave function. The aggregate domestic production






By log-linearization, this can be transformed into
b YH;t = ￿
h





























. Without nominal rigidities, because the country size is the
same, the demand function is given by
YH;t = (1 + ￿)p￿1
H;tCW
t ; (35)
where we use equation (12). This can be linearly approximated as
b YH;t = b CW
t ￿ b pH;t:
At the same time, from equation (2),














































where we use the relation of b CW
t = b YH;t ￿ 1
2 d ToTt.
Similarly, we can obtain the linearized equation for the foreign marginal cost with







































where we use the relation of b CW
t = b YF;t + 1
2 d ToTt, which can be derived under the speci￿-
cation of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator in equation (1).
2.3 Private Banks
There exists a continuum of private banks located over [0;1]. There are two types of bank
in each country: local banks that populate the interval [0;n) and international banks that
populate the interval [n;1]. Each private bank has two roles: (1) to collect the deposits
15from consumers in its country, and (2) under the monopolistically competitive loan market,
to set di⁄erentiated nominal loan interest rates according to their individual loan demand
curves, given the amount of their deposits. We assume that each bank sets the di⁄erentiated
nominal loan interest rate according to the types of labor force as examined in Teranishi
(2007). Staggered loan contracts between ￿rms and private banks produce a situation
in which the private banks ￿x the loan interest rates for a certain period. A local bank
lends only to ￿rms when they hire labor from the DFS group. However, an international
bank only provides loans to ￿rms when they hire labor from the IFS group. The lending
structure is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Lending structure
Local bank International bank
Home country for f to hire h for f￿ to hire h
￿
Foreign country for f￿ to hire h￿ for f to hire h
First, we describe the optimization problem for an international bank in the home
country. In this case, the exchange rate risk is shared by the ￿rm in the foreign country
and the international banks in the domestic country according to ￿￿ and 1 ￿ ￿￿. Each
international bank has the opportunity to reset loan interest rates with probability 1 ￿ ￿
￿
following the Calvo (1983) ￿Yun (1996) framework.12 Within the segmented environment
stemming from di⁄erences in labor supply, private banks can set di⁄erent loan interest rates
depending on the types of labor. As a consequence, private banks hold some monopoly
power over the loan interest rate o⁄ered to ￿rms.
Therefore, the international bank h
￿





12The staggered loan contracts in this paper work in the same way as the staggered wage contracts model
in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), the crucial di⁄erence being the presence of international linkages in
the international staggered loan contracts setting used here. In our model, the sticky loan interest rate is
the only source of economic distortion. However, as shown in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002), the implications
for monetary policy are still valid.





















￿ (1 + iT)
￿
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"￿ST (1 + iT)
+
h










Because the international private banks that have the opportunity to reset their loan in-





is simply rt. In this case, the evolution of the aggregate loan interest rate index for loans
o⁄ered by international banks in the home country is described by:
1 + RF;t = ￿
￿




(1 + rt): (40)
By log-linearizing equations (39) and (40), we can determine the relationship between the
loan and deposit interest rate as follows:
b RF;t = ￿
￿
1Et b RF;t+1 + ￿
￿










1Et b RF;t+1 + ￿
￿










































are positive parameters, u￿
t is the shock to this loan rate curve, and iSS and RSS denote
steady state nominal interest rates and loan rates respectively. This equation describes
the foreign country￿ s loan interest rate (supply) curve for loans o⁄ered by the international
bank in the home country.13
Similarly, from the optimization problem of a local bank h in the home country, we can
obtain the relationship between the loan and deposit interest rates as follows:











1+RSS are positive parameters,
and ut is the shock to this loan rate curve. This equation describes the home country￿ s
13We assume that this shock is a purely nominal shock, which does not alter the allocations under the
￿ exible price equilibrium.
17loan interest rate (supply) curve for loans o⁄ered by the local bank in the home country.





2, and ￿3 = ￿
￿
3, and ut = u￿
t. In this case the law of one price is seen operating in
the loan interest rates set by domestic private banks.
For international banks in the foreign country, we can derive the following loan interest
rate curve:
b R￿
H;t = ￿1Et b R￿
H;t+1 + ￿2 b R￿
H;t￿1 + ￿3
h























positive parameters, and ut is the shock to this loan rate curve. This equation describes
the home country￿ s loan interest rate (supply) curve for loans o⁄ered by the international

























t is the shock to this loan rate curve. This equation describes the foreign
country￿ s loan interest rate (supply) curve for loans o⁄ered by the local bank in the foreign
country. It should be noted that the four di⁄erent types of private bank (depending on
whether they are local or international, operating at home or abroad) can have di⁄erent
probabilities of resetting their loan interest rates.
2.4 System of Equation
The linearized system of equations consists of eight equations: (27), (31), (37), (38), (41),
(42), (43), (44), and two optimal monetary policies derived in the following sections for 10
endogenous variables: b CW, d ToT, d lmc, d lmc
￿
, b RF, b RH, b R￿
H, b R￿
F, b i and b i￿.14 Except for the
two optimal monetary policies b i and b i￿, the variables are summarized in Table 2.
A very straightforward explanation is possible for this system. Equations (41) to (44)
determine the cost of borrowing, and these combined de￿ne the marginal costs in equations
14If we further add equations (8), (11), (12) and (14), we can derive the optimal responses in ￿, ￿
￿, and
S as shown in ￿gures below.
18Table 2: System of Equations
Eq. (27): ￿1 b RH;t + ￿2 b R￿
H;t + d lmct + (1 ￿ n)￿
￿







2 b RF;t + d lmc
￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ n￿)￿￿
￿




Eq. (37): d lmct =
￿
1































Eq. (41): b RF;t = ￿
￿
1Et b RF;t+1 + ￿
￿









Eq. (42): b RH;t = ￿1Et b RH;t+1 + ￿2 b RH;t￿1 + ￿3b it + ut
Eq. (43): b R￿
H;t = ￿1Et b R￿
H;t+1 + ￿2 b R￿
H;t￿1 + ￿3
h













(27) and (31). The aggregate consumption and the terms of trade are solely determined
by these marginal costs as in equations (37) and (38).
3 Welfare Analysis
3.1 Preference
We assume that U(￿), U￿(￿), V (￿) and V ￿(￿) are isoelastic functions as










where ￿ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and ￿ is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.15 In the following analysis, we assume ￿ = 1, namely the log
utility, and the linear production function as YH;t = e Lt and YF;t = e L￿
t.
We choose this parametric assumption since we would like to focus solely on the im-
plications for monetary policy of an internationally integrated ￿nancial market and its
intrinsic frictions. As already shown in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002), Clarida, Gal￿, and
Gertler (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), under the
15￿ ￿ ￿
UC
UCCC and ￿ ￿
Vlll
Vl .
19assumption of log utility together with the Cobb-Douglas aggregator in equation (1), the
optimal allocations under cooperative and noncooperative monetary policy coincide when
there are no international loan contracts. Furthermore, an inward-looking monetary pol-
icy that responds only to the domestic variable becomes optimal and there are no gains
from targeting the exchange rate. The reasoning behind this optimality of independent
and inward-looking monetary policy is as follows. There exist no direct e⁄ects from for-
eign activities on the domestic marginal cost since the terms of trade and risk sharing
e⁄ects cancel. Mathematically, with a log utility function where ￿ = 1, the terms of trade
disappear in equations (37) and (38). As a result, no central bank has any incentive to
manipulate the exchange rate, i.e., the terms of trade, so that it can shift the burden of
production to the foreign country. Hence, by making the parametric assumptions above,
we can investigate whether the newly introduced international ￿nancial market imperfec-
tions have any new previously unstudied implications for monetary policy cooperation and
exchange rate targeting.
3.2 Noncooperative Allocation
We derive a second-order approximation of the welfare function for each country following
Woodford (2003). To eliminate the linear term in the quadratic approximation in the
noncooperative allocation stemming from the di⁄erence between consumption and output
in open economies, we follow Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002), where output and the policy
interest rate in the foreign country are assumed to be given for the home central bank and
the ￿scal authority sets the optimal subsidy in a noncooperative manner.16 Furthermore,
as is standard for cost push shocks in New Keynesian models, we assume that the shocks
to the loan interest rates do not alter the output in the ￿ exible price equilibrium. The
details of the derivation are shown in the Appendix.
16This problem does not occur under the strict parametric assumptions employed in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) where an analytical solution of the optimal monetary policy is
available. Another method to eliminate the linear term in the quadratic approximation is found in Benigno
and Benigno (2003). We will show that under some special conditions, since ￿nancial stability becomes the
optimal independent monetary policy, we can derive the optimal noncooperative monetary policy following
Benigno and Benigno (2003).























Then, we have a second-order approximated loss function for the home country as follows:
Lt ’ ￿YH b Y 2
H;t + ￿H
￿












￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿























(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿), and ￿HH ￿ n(1 ￿ n) 1
2(1+￿).
There are several intriguing points to be noted. First, the central bank has to stabilize
the ￿nancial market as captured by the last three terms in equation (45). The central bank
dislikes any dispersion in loan rates whether from home or foreign banks, as can be seen from
the second and third terms dealing with loan rate ￿ uctuations.
￿
￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿
H;t ￿ ￿b i
￿2
implies that the home central bank should seek to minimize the credit spread, i.e., the
relative marginal cost dispersion. Second, the presence of the policy interest rate in the
last term also implies that the central bank has an incentive to control the nominal exchange
rate and to lower the marginal cost to favor domestic ￿rms if the ￿rms are not free from the
exchange rate risk, i.e., ￿ > 0. Third, the heterogeneity in the ￿nancial market complicates
monetary policy. The central bank faces a trade-o⁄ in an international ￿nancial market
with di⁄erent speeds of loan rate adjustment. For example, when there is no asymmetry in
the loan rates faced by domestic ￿rms with respect to structural parameters and the size
of shocks, namely ￿1 = ￿
￿
1, ￿2 = ￿
￿
2, ￿3 = ￿
￿
3, n = 0:5, and ut = u￿
t, and domestic ￿rms
are free from the exchange rate risk, i.e., ￿ = 0, the credit spread term disappears and the
loss function in equation (45) is reduced to
Lt ’ ￿YH b Y 2
H;t + ￿
￿
b Rt ￿ b Rt￿1
￿2
;
where b Rt = b RH;t = b R￿
H;t and ￿ = ￿H = ￿￿
H. Fourth, the central bank in the home
country needs to monitor the lending behavior of private banks in the foreign country. As
the second term in equation (45) shows, a change in the speed with which loan rates are
adjusted by foreign private banks a⁄ects the optimal path of the policy interest rate set
21by the central bank in the home country. When there are no international loan contracts,
i.e., n = 1, the central bank does not take account of the loan rates set by foreign private
banks.
The optimal monetary policy in this situation aims at minimizing the home loss function
subject to equations (27), (42), and (43) as in the closed economy model. We will come
back to this point in the following section.
Through a similar procedure, we can derive a second-order approximated loss function
for the foreign country as follows:
L￿
t ’ ￿YF b Y 2
F;t + ￿F
￿
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2 b R￿






























FF ￿ n￿(1 ￿ n￿) 1
2(1+￿). The optimal monetary policy in the foreign country minimizes
this foreign loss function subject to equations (31), (41), and (44).
3.3 Cooperative Allocation
Similarly, we can derive the world loss function which central banks coordinating their
policies would aim to minimize.17 In the case of noncooperative monetary policy, we follow
Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and compute the optimal subsidy under cooperative ￿scal
policy. The derived loss function is given by
LW
t = Lt + L￿
t = ￿YH b Y 2















￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿
H;t ￿ ￿
￿





















b i ￿b i￿
￿i2
:
Note that nothing is given in this loss function under cooperative monetary policy. The
cooperating central banks aim at minimizing the world loss function subject to equations
(27), (42), (43), (31), (41), and (44).
17For details, see Appendix.
22In contrast to the noncooperative allocation,
h
￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿
H;t ￿ ￿
￿
b i ￿b i￿
￿i2
means
that the home and foreign central banks should seek jointly to minimize the loan rate
di⁄erence. This implies that central banks have an incentive to jointly manage the nominal
exchange rate.
3.4 Welfare Weight
Here, we show how the weights, namely ￿H and ￿HH as well as the ratio ￿YH, in the social
loss functions given by equations (45), (46), and (47) change as the parameters for ￿nancial
openness n and loan rate stickiness ￿ are altered. The aim is to determine whether ￿nancial
market integration with a heterogeneous degree of ￿nancial market imperfection alters the
nature of the optimal monetary policy. We use the parameters in Table 3, most of which
are from Woodford (2003).
Table 3: Parameter Values
Parameters Values Explanation
￿ 0.99 Subjective discount factor
￿ 1 Dependence on external ￿nance
￿ 7.66 Elasticity of substitution among di⁄erentiated labor
￿ 1 Elasticity of the desired real wage to the quantity of labor demanded
￿ 0 Elasticity of marginal cost with respect to y regarding production
￿ 1 Elasticity of the output to additional labor input
￿ 1 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
￿ 7.66 Elasticity of substitution among di⁄erentiated goods
￿;￿￿;￿;￿
￿
0.5 Calvo parameters for loan interest rates
n;n￿ 0.5 Preference for DFS labor
Figure 2 shows the case with changing n. Here a larger n means lower ￿nancial openness.
Under symmetric assumptions except for the altered parameters between the two countries,
￿YH does not move with changes in n and ￿. ￿H, which measures the importance of the
welfare loss stemming from the loan rate stickiness of the domestic (foreign) banks￿loans to
















Figure 2: Loss Weights with Di⁄erent n.
domestic ￿rms, naturally increases (decreases) as the ￿nancial dependency on the domestic
(foreign) banks becomes larger (smaller). A similar discussion is applied for ￿￿
H. Although
the loss from the credit spread measured by ￿HH is very small under the assumption of
￿ = ￿ = ￿￿ = ￿
￿
= 0:5, the response for the changes in n is non-monotonic. The term
￿
￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿




￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿
H;t ￿ ￿
￿
b i ￿b i￿
￿i2
require central banks to
stabilize the loan rate di⁄erence between domestic and foreign banks. In extreme cases
where n = 1 or 0, there is no such dispersion. When n lies between 0 and 1, there emerges
some marginal cost dispersion stemming from borrowing, which peaks when n = 0:5. This
distortion becomes relatively important when there is less stickiness in the loan contracts
as Figure 3 below shows.
Figure 3 illustrates what happens when the loan rate stickiness in domestic banks￿
lending increases. Naturally, ￿H becomes larger as the loan rate stickiness at domestic
banks increases, because this increases the relative loan rate dispersion among domestic
￿rms. These results hold for ￿YF, ￿F, ￿￿
F, and ￿￿
FF. An important implication of this
exercise is that asymmetry in the loan rate stickiness between domestic and foreign banks
















Figure 3: Loss Weights with Di⁄erent ’.
alters the weights in the social loss functions and may have signi￿cant implications for the
optimal conduct of monetary policy cooperation.
4 International Financial Stability as Optimal Monetary Pol-
icy
We investigate the properties of the optimal monetary policy when ￿nancial markets are
internationally integrated. As equations (45), (46), and (47) show, ￿nancial stability in-
volves minimizing the dispersion among loan rates. By minimizing this dispersion, the
central bank acts to reduce markup ￿ uctuations and hence consumers￿disutility from la-
bor. Thus, as a general principle, in the absence of distortions other than staggered loan
contracts, we have
Proposition 1 Regardless of whether cooperation is possible, central banks aim at achiev-
ing ￿nancial stability.
25Nevertheless, whether ￿nancial stability is the sole target of the central bank depends on
other assumptions a⁄ecting the model￿ s structure, namely parameters and shocks. Another
interesting question is whether we can obtain the standard NOEM results regarding the
optimality of inward-looking and independent monetary policy with a ￿ exible exchange
rate.
Before moving on to other propositions, for convenience, we rewrite the optimality
conditions in Table 2 using lag (L) and forward (F) operators and substituting them into
the requisite loss functions. Then, equations (45) and (46) become
Lt = ￿YH
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1 + ￿)
￿1 ￿1 (1 ￿ ￿1F ￿ ￿2L)￿3
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where b it is considered to be given. Furthermore, naturally,
LW
t = Lt + L￿
t;
where no endogenous variables are considered to be given. This transformation enables
us to analyze the nature of the optimal monetary policy with internationally integrated
￿nancial markets more intuitively.
26Proposition 2 Even when ￿nancial markets are internationally integrated and banks lend
both at home and abroad, there is no gain from cooperation among central banks if the
exchange rate risks are completely covered by banks, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿ = 0.
When ￿ = ￿￿ = 0, the international banks take on all the risk stemming from exchange
rate ￿ uctuations. As a result, the foreign policy interest rate falls out of equation (48).
Then, no central bank has any incentive to manipulate the welfare of counterpart country.
Therefore, in this situation, as long as we assume log utility and the Cobb-Douglas ag-
gregator as in Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2002), and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), the existence
of ￿nancial market imperfections does not alter the optimality of independent monetary
policy. It is worth mentioning the reason why the domestic central bank does not need any
assistance from the foreign central bank, even though some portion of lending comes from
foreign banks whose cost is the policy rate in the foreign country. This is because of the
UIP condition. The cost for the foreign international bank lending to the home country
￿rms, including all the risks from exchange rate ￿ uctuations, is simply the domestic policy
interest rate, as equations (42) and (43) illustrate. Even under the kind of complicated
￿nancing arrangements we see today as long as the exchange rate risks are completely
covered by the lending banks and the UIP condition holds, the domestic central bank can
completely control the loan rates o⁄ered by foreign international banks. Thus, we also have
Proposition 3 The optimal monetary policy is inward-looking if the exchange rate risks
are completely covered by banks, i.e., ￿ = ￿￿ = 0. Each central bank manipulates the policy
interest rate so as to stabilize only the loan rates applied to ￿rms in her country.
Consequently, as long as ￿ = ￿￿ = 0, we can derive the standard theoretical prescriptions
on the optimal monetary policy in open economies, namely independent policy and a
￿ exible exchange rate.
Another intriguing issue is whether the complete stabilization of loan interest rates is
possible. In other words, can monetary policy achieve zero social loss? Equations (48) and
(49) clarify this point. By setting the policy interest rates as






the social losses in both countries become zero. The exchange rate is expected to move
in accordance with the above two monetary policy prescriptions as a result of the UIP
condition in equation (13). This, however, does not cause any welfare deterioration since
movements in nominal exchange rates have no impact on the marginal costs in either
country when ￿ = ￿￿ = 0. Then, we have
Proposition 4 When the exchange rate risks are completely covered by banks, ￿ = ￿￿ = 0,
and the economic structures (parameters) are the same in the two countries, complete
stabilization becomes possible regardless of whether monetary policy is noncooperative or




When 0 < ￿; ￿￿ ￿ 1, international banks and ￿rms share the risks arising from exchange
rate ￿ uctuations. Interestingly, although with the exception of 0 < ￿; ￿￿ ￿ 1 the other
parameter settings in this paper are the same as in previous studies of the optimality of
independent and inward-looking monetary policy, there exist gains from cooperation in
our economy. Both equations (48) and (49) contain the policy interest rate set by the
other country￿ s central bank, which is outside their own control. Since monetary policy
cooperation enables all policy interest rates to be internalized, higher social welfare can
be achieved in both countries than when two independent monetary policies are pursued.
The proposition below therefore represents very much a new feature in the literature on
the optimal monetary policy in open economies.
Proposition 5 When the risks arising from exchange rate ￿uctuations are shared between
international banks and ￿rms, i.e., 0 < ￿; ￿￿ ￿ 1, there exist gains from cooperation.
When 0 < ￿; ￿￿ ￿ 1, ￿rms su⁄er from future exchange rate ￿ uctuations and this acts
to raise their marginal cost relative to when they are free from exchange rate risk. In order
18In this case, since attaining complete ￿nancial stability is optimal and possible, we can also derive the
optimal noncooperative policy following Benigno and Benigno (2003).
28to lower the marginal cost and increase social welfare, in the absence of cooperation the
central bank faces a trade-o⁄ stabilizing between the ￿nancial market imperfections and
the nominal exchange rate. The mechanism is similar to that discussed in the context of
￿xed exchange rates with local currency pricing in Devereux and Engel (2003) and Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005). With local currency pricing, since exporting ￿rms face the exchange
rate risk, they set higher markups than in the case of producer currency pricing. Although
in both set-ups ￿rms end up with higher markups due to exchange rate ￿ uctuations, the
exchange rate risk a⁄ects the marginal cost through the demand channel in our paper
whereas it acts through the supply channel in the case of local currency pricing. As a
result, we also have
Proposition 6 When the risks from exchange rate ￿uctuations are shared between inter-
national banks and ￿rms, i.e., 0 < ￿; ￿￿ ￿ 1, there exist gains from joint nominal exchange
rate management.
5 Discussion
There have been many empirical studies showing that ￿rms borrow in foreign currency,
i.e., that they hold foreign currency denominated debt, even though the ratios of foreign
currency denominated debts to total debts are di⁄erent among countries. Speci￿cally,
Kedia and Mozumdar (2003) suggest that about 1% of US ￿rms￿debt was foreign currency
denominated in 1998. Gray, Harjes, Jobst, Laxton, Tamirisa, and Stavrev (2007) report
that, for East Asian countries, about 5% of ￿rm￿ s loans were held in foreign currencies in
2005. For emerging countries, Jeanne (2003) reports much larger proportions of foreign-
currency denominated ￿rm debt. The ratio of foreign currency borrowing to total debt was
around 60% in Argentina, 40% in Mexico, and 20% in Brazil in the 1990s. Rosenberg and
Tirpak (2008) show that the new euro member states also rely heavily on foreign currency
borrowing. Surprisingly, the ratio of foreign currency debt to GDP is 70% in Latvia and
Estonia and 30% even in Hungary and Bulgaria, for example. These empirical facts support
the assumption that ￿ > 0 and ￿￿ > 0 even though values of these parameters should di⁄er
among countries.





















Figure 4: Welfare gains through cooperative monetary policy.
Based on the calibration in Table 3 with varying settings of ￿ = ￿￿ = 0 , ￿ = ￿￿ =
0:25, ￿ = ￿￿ = 0:5, and ￿ = ￿￿ = 0:75, we compute welfare gains from cooperative
instead of noncooperative monetary policy. We give a 1% positive loan rate shock with 0.9
AR(1) persistence to the domestic currency loan rate set by the local bank in the home
country, i.e., to ut. We assume the commitment optimal monetary policies in the two
countries following Woodford (2003). Figure 4 shows the ratio between world welfare under
cooperative monetary policy and world welfare under noncooperative monetary policy.
In this ￿gure, a value less than unity indicates that the cooperative monetary policy is
superior, which is clearly seen to be the case. As domestic ￿rms become vulnerable to the
exchange rate risk, namely as ￿ increases, the cooperative monetary policy becomes more
bene￿cial. This implies that incentives for cooperative monetary policy in developed coun-
tries with low ratios of foreign currency denominated debts are weaker than in developing
countries with high ratios of foreign currency denominated debt.
Moreover, surprisingly, central bank cooperation achieves much higher welfare gains
when loan contracts are less sticky. This is because, when monetary policy is noncoopera-
30tive, nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations are larger under ￿ exible loan contracts than under
sticky loan contracts . As a result, the welfare gains from cooperation are more substantial,
since joint management of the exchange rate enables central banks to reduce the exchange
rate ￿ uctuations which are detrimental to domestic ￿rms￿marginal costs.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a NOEM model with international ￿nancial frictions
and have analyzed the nature of the optimal monetary policy when ￿nancial markets are
internationally integrated. We demonstrate that, within this economic setting and in the
absence of any other nominal rigidities, the main aim of the central bank is to achieve
the ￿nancial stability which means eliminating the ine¢ cient ￿ uctuations of loan interest
rate. Yet, at the same time, the heterogeneity in international ￿nancial markets makes
the optimal conduct of monetary policy very complicated, suggesting that central banks
face a trade-o⁄ unrevealed by previous studies. We show that if the exchange rate risk is
partially shared among goods-producing ￿rms, the central bank should aim to stabilize the
nominal exchange rate in achieving ￿nancial stability. This is because the ￿ uctuations in
the nominal exchange rate increase the average markup set by ￿rms which is detrimental
to welfare.
One possible challenge for our future research is to incorporate sticky prices in open
economies as in Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) and to
estimate such a model. This would enable a quantitative investigation of the policy trade-
o⁄ between stabilizing distortions in goods and ￿nancial markets. It would also enable us
to obtain robust policy prescriptions for an economy operating within a global banking
system. Another direction is to examine the role of ￿scal policy in addition to monetary
policy under internationally integrated ￿nancial markets.
A Appendix: Derivation of the Loss Function
In this section, we derive a second-order approximation to the welfare function following
Woodford (2003).
31A.1 Noncooperative case





















The ￿rst term of equation (50) can be approximated up to the second order as
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expresses higher-order terms than the second-order approximation.





























































Here, we use the labor aggregator as in equation (15) in the second-order approximation
such as









This combined with equations (52) and (53) yields
Z n
0














































where we use the approximation for equation (20). From equation (32), the condition that








32whose second-order approximation becomes























By substituting this, we can now transform equation (54) into
Z n
0
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where we use the following:
b Lt ￿ b Lt =
h
￿1 b RH;t ￿ ￿2 b R￿
H;t ￿ ￿
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b Lt ￿ b Lt
￿
;
which are derived using equations (9), (10) (16), (17), (18), (19), (21), and (22). Further-
more, following Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002), we replace 1
￿LVl by 1
2CUc thanks to the
social planner￿ s optimization problem.19
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where ￿l ￿ ￿
￿
￿ + "￿1￿
. To transform varhb lt(h) and varhb lt(h) further, we use the optimal
conditions of labor supply and demand functions given by equations (9), (10), (24) and
(25). Approximation of these equations leads to

















19The social planner optimizes the following problem:
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2 ; where YF is exogeneously given.
33where ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿2
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r ￿ ￿￿￿l = ￿￿2
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1+￿￿. Here, we also assume that
the central bank aims at stabilizing the deviations from the nonstochastic e¢ cient steady
state. The remaining important part is to transform varh ln[1 + rt (h)] in equation (57).
Following Woodford (2003), we de￿ne RH;t and 4R
t as
RH;t ￿ Eh ln[1 + rt (h)];
and
4R
t ￿ varh ln[1 + rt (h)]:









Furthermore, the following is also derived from the log-linear approximation:
RH;t = ln(1 + RH;t) + Order(k ￿ k2); (59)
where we make use of the de￿nition of the aggregate loan rates:
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where we assume parameters in Table 3 and the given foreign output and policy rate. We
have similar procedures to derive the loss function of the foreign country under noncoop-
erative allocation.
A.2 Cooperative case
In this case, the following conditions are newly necessary.
(1) the output in abroad is not given for two countries,
(2) following Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler (2002), we replace 1
￿LVl by CUc thanks to the
social planner￿ s optimization problem.20
Then, the world loss function LW
t = Lt + L￿
t is given by
LW
t = Lt + L￿
t = ￿YH b Y 2
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